Goldberg Segalla

In a significant case of first impression that will likely serve as a test case for medical care providers in Connecticut, Goldberg Segalla recently succeeded in defending client attorneys who were accused of vexatious litigation in their representation of a plaintiff in medical malpractice claims against a Hartford-area hospital. Elizabeth M. Cristofaro and Lila M. McKinley, attorneys in the firm’s Professional Liability Practice Group in the Hartford office, represented the defendant attorneys in this case argued before Judge Vincent E. Roche in the Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Litchfield.

After our client attorneys tried twice unsuccessfully to bring medical malpractice cases against a hospital and other health care providers for the suicide of plaintiff’s wife, the hospital sued the attorneys for vexatious litigation. The hospital argued that, since the first lawsuit was dismissed for failure to attach an opinion letter of a similar healthcare provider, the attorneys commenced and prosecuted the first action without probable cause. The client attorneys filed a second medical malpractice action under Connecticut’s saving statute, arguing that the first lawsuit was dismissed as a matter of form. The hospital argued that the attorneys commenced and prosecuted the second action without probable cause, claiming the first case lacked probable cause because there was no opinion letter attached to the first lawsuit. The hospital also argued that the attorneys were collaterally estopped from arguing the issue of lack of probable cause because in the second lawsuit, a bifurcated trial was held to determine the adequacy of the credentials of the author of the opinion letter, and the hospital prevailed as it was determined that the author of the opinion letter did not meet the requirements under the statute.  

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and on January 11, 2012, the court ruled in favor of our client attorneys, denying the hospital’s motion and granting our motion for summary judgment in which we argued that the attorneys had probable cause to bring both medical malpractice actions.

The court adopted our position in ruling the hospital’s theory that the lack of an opinion letter alone is sufficient to prove lack of probable cause is too narrow an interpretation of the issues in a vexatious litigation suit. The court further held the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude the issues presented in this case, again adopting our position. The court stated that the issue of whether probable cause existed was not fully and fairly litigated in the first action. Additionally, the court looked at the evidence submitted in the motions for summary judgment, including an affidavit from the defendant attorney, and concluded that no reasonable attorney would state, given the facts known by the defendants at the time the suits were commenced, that there was no probable cause to commence either medical malpractice action.

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