Jurisdiction: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Plaintiffs Erica Dandry Constanza and Monica Dandry Hallner allege decedent Michael P. Dandry Jr. developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure while working for Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (Avondale).

Plaintiffs allege decedent was employed by Avondale between June 1, 1971, and August 16, 1971, during which he was exposed to asbestos on Avondale’s premises. Plaintiffs also name numerous additional defendants who made and sold asbestos-containing products. Several motions for partial summary judgment were decided.

I.

Plaintiffs moved the court for partial summary judgment, that defendants cannot prove decedent sustained exposures to asbestos from “neighboring properties.” Defendants Avondale, Paramount Global, and Bayer CropScience Inc. opposed the motion.

Defendants advanced an alternate theory of decedent’s asbestos exposure starting in the 1950s, including on properties near decedent’s childhood home and workplace in Marrero, La., both of which were part of a larger property complex owned by decedent’s grandfather, and of which a driveway, parking lot, and courtyard area were composed of scrap material containing asbestos manufactured by Johns-Manville.

Avondale’s expert took soil samples of this property. Sixteen of 20 soil samples contained asbestos fibers greater than the one percent EPA threshold, primarily chrysotile, with some crocidolite.

In favor of partial summary judgment, plaintiffs argued the only information submitted by Avondale’s expert is that in March 2025 the subject neighboring properties contained some amount of asbestos, but that Avondale had submitted no evidence that any of the properties where decedent personally lived or worked contained asbestos, or that decedent actually disturbed asbestos scrap material from the neighboring properties. Furthermore, Avondale’s own expert admitted that there exists no scientific data supporting the idea that merely walking on such scrap material would release asbestos fibers above background levels.

Plaintiffs contend Avondale has only submitted a mere possibility of asbestos exposure and this is not sufficient to meet burden of proof, as Avondale lacked factual proof of an actual disturbance of asbestos scrap, and lacked scientific proof that such disturbance releases asbestos fibers above background.

According to Avondale, decedent’s family members testified that decedent played in the subject neighboring property, was always coming in and out of the various businesses on the neighboring property and continued to visit the property even after moving away. Avondale argued that its expert opined that based on such testimony, decedent did have potential exposure to asbestos while living on and visiting the subject property complex.

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ argument that this testimony should be disregarded for lack of specific data, i.e. lack of air monitoring results obtained while decedent was allegedly exposed to asbestos on the property starting in the 1950s, is fatally flawed because by the same logic, there were similarly no air monitoring results while decedent was working on Avondale premises in 1971, and thus plaintiffs would be unable to prove decedent was exposed to asbestos at any location.

The court agreed with defendants, finding that there remained genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment, and denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.

II.

Avondale brought third-party claims against the alleged insurer for Wayne Manufacturing Corporation for negligence and strict liability as a commercial supplier of asbestos-containing products. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Wayne can be held strictly liability as a commercial supplier.

The insurer argued that the first and only reference to “commercial supplier” strict liability in Louisiana caselaw was not until 1991, long after decedent’s alleged asbestos exposures. Retroactive application of substantive law is impermissible without express legislative expression to the contrary.

Additionally, the insurer argued that “commercial supplier strict liability” is not, and has never been, a valid theory of liability. The only Louisiana case to use the phrase “commercial supplier” is Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co. (1991). There, according to the Insurer, the Guidry court was not creating a new type of liability but was applying strict liability principles.

According to Avondale, Wayne can be held liable under a commercial supplier theory of strict liability. Under Guidry, strict liability applies when “(1) the injury resulted from the condition of the product; (2) the condition made the product unreasonably dangerous in normal use; and (3) the condition existed at the time the product left the control of the supplier.”

Avondale argued this test is satisfied here because (1) Decedent’s mesothelioma resulted in part from exposure to asbestos from panels manufactured/supplied by Wayne and cut and installed on ships at Avondale; (2) the panels were unreasonably dangerous because they had asbestos; and (3) the panels contained asbestos when Wayne relinquished control of them.

The court agreed that the Guidry court was not creating a new theory of liability. Guidry cited Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast which stated, “plaintiffs had to prove that: … the [unreasonably dangerous] condition existed at the time the product left the control of the supplier.”

The court held that Avondale did not show Guidry is applicable to this case. Louisiana survival actions in asbestos cases are governed by the law in effect at the time of exposure. Guidry was decided in 1991, while this case relates to 1971 asbestos exposure at Avondale’s shipyard.

Further, Guidry is also distinguishable on the facts. The defendant in Guidry not only had actual control of the relevant product but altered it to make it unreasonably dangerous (contaminating non-explosive diesel fuel with gasoline, which made the mixture explosive). Unlike in Guidry, Avondale did not present any evidence to show that Wayne altered the asbestos-containing panels to make it unreasonably dangerous, only that Wayne had control over the panels. The panels contained asbestos from the manufacturing process done by Johns-Manville, not by Wayne.

Therefore, there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the insurer’s motion is granted and claims against it are dismissed with prejudice.

III.

Avondale filed a crossclaim against defendant Paramount Global for contribution. Paramount moved for partial summary judgment regarding turbines to dismiss all claims regarding Paramount’s marine turbines as a potential source of decedent’s asbestos exposure.

Co-worker Billy Jambon was employed by Avondale in a similar role as decedent during the same time. He recalled seeing decedent working as a machinist helper at Avondale in the engine rooms of ships under construction, on turbines manufactured by Paramount. Jambon noted that in the engine rooms, decedent would have worked around insulators insulating pipes and equipment, a dusty process.

Paramount argued that under the applicable “substantial factor” test, plaintiffs must prove “frequent” and “regular” exposure to the source of asbestos, and that there is no evidence that decedent personally worked on a Paramount turbine or was bystander to work on one, and that the mere presence of Paramount turbines on vessels at Avondale does not prove that decedent was actually exposed to asbestos attributable to those turbines. Paramount also argued a “bare metal” defense. Finally, Paramount argued it cannot be liable because Paramount “did not manufacture, sell, design, install, specify, require, or recommend that asbestos-containing exterior insulation be applied to its marine turbines”, nor did Paramount have a duty to warn about “the dangers inherent in the products of third parties”.

Avondale argued that Paramount incorrectly cited a more stringent causation standard of “frequent, regular exposure” reserved for asbestosis and lung cancer cases in Louisiana, not mesothelioma. Avondale attacked Paramount’s “bare metal” defense as follows: since Paramount designed its turbines to require insulation for proper functioning, it must have known that asbestos-containing insulation would be used, since this was the only effective and commercially available insulation material at the time. Avondale cited co-worker Jambon’s testimony and several expert reports as evidence that asbestos exposure from Paramount turbines was indeed a cause of decedent’s mesothelioma. Avondale also offered several Avondale employees’ and Paramount representatives’ testimony that Paramount did in fact, by turbine design, direction, and even shipping asbestos accessories, specify asbestos-containing insulation to be used with its turbines until 1973.

The court disagreed with Paramount on the applicable exposure standard for mesothelioma, citing Williams v. Boeing Co. in the Fifth Circuit. The court also held that a reasonable jury, based on the coworker Jambon’s testimony, could find decedent inhaled asbestos fibers from Paramount turbines.

Analyzing the testimony from former Avondale employees and Paramount representatives, the court agreed that a reasonable jury could find that Paramount had a duty to warn of later incorporation of dangerous parts for the integrated product to function as intended, citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries. The court denied Paramount’s motion.

Copies of the rulings can be found here.