Supreme Court: Plaintiffs Claiming Reverse Discrimination Not Required to Meet Heightened Evidentiary Burden
Key Takeaways
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In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a disagreement between circuit courts over the burden of proof required by a plaintiff from a majority group alleging discrimination under Title VII
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The standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether the plaintiff is a member of a majority group
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Employers should be mindful not to discriminate against any individual when making employment decisions, regardless of membership in a minority or majority group
The U.S. Supreme Court on June 5 rendered an opinion in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. ___ (2025).), resolving a circuit split regarding the applicable standard under the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII when a plaintiff is a member of a majority group. In Ames, the court held Title VII draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. To require plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard, namely showing “background circumstances,” imposes additional requirements not contemplated by the text of Title VII.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Ames involved a heterosexual woman employed by the Ohio Department of Youth Services in various roles since 2004.
In 2019, Ames was working as program administrator and interviewed for a newly created management position with the department. The department ultimately hired a lesbian woman to fill the role. A few days later, Ames was demoted from her role as program administrator and assumed a secretarial role, which came with a significant pay cut. A gay man was then hired to fill the vacant program administrator position.
Ames sued the department under Title VII, claiming she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation. The lower courts analyzed Ames’ claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is the traditional framework used for evaluating disparate treatment claims under Title VII. The Supreme Court rejected lower court holdings that Ames needed to show “background circumstances” in addition to meeting her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing enough evidence to support an inference of discrimination. The Supreme Court determined the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether the individual plaintiff is a member of a majority group or a minority group.
While the Supreme Court’s decision was unanimous, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas indicated he agreed with the court’s decision that to impose a heightened burden by requiring majority-group Title VII plaintiffs to show “background circumstances” was improper judicial lawmaking. But Justice Thomas also took issue with the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework as it too lacks basis in the text of Title VII. Nonetheless, judge-created rules unsupported by statutory text create confusion and erroneous results. Therefore, requiring majority-group plaintiffs to show “background circumstances” was correctly rejected.
In light of Ames, employers are advised to be mindful of the effects employment decisions have on the terms and conditions of employees, regardless of an employee’s membership in a minority or majority group, and to seek employment counsel prior to making those decisions.
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