Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division 5
Plaintiff, a mechanic, and his wife brought suit against American Honda Motor Co. following his diagnosis of Mesothelioma in spring 2024. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he believed he was exposed to asbestos in connection to OEM brakes on Honda vehicles, that Honda’s brakes suffered a designed defect, and that Honda had a duty to warn of latent dangers regarding its brakes. As such, plaintiff alleged Honda should be found liable under both strict liability and negligence theories.
The matter progressed to trial. Plaintiff produced evidence from their industrial hygienist that estimated that plaintiff performed up to 16,750 brake jobs in his career between 1976 and 1994 and, of those jobs, approximately 216 to 432 were on Honda vehicles. Plaintiff testified that he used OEM brakes from Honda, approximately only 20 percent of the time. In specific reference to plaintiff’s allegation that the design of Honda’s Brake System was defective, plaintiff pointed to a letter sent from Honda to the EPA in 1986, requesting information from the agency regarding its asbestos phase-out schedule as Honda would need “time for developing and testing asbestos free parts to replace current parts,” including brake pads, which would require a redesign to account for the frictional characteristics of the non-asbestos pads. However, the defense pointed to testimony from its corporate representative that Honda “did not retrofit the old vehicles and simply developed new designs for new cars…while incorporating the new, non-asbestos material.” Of particular note, Honda’s corporate representative testified that Honda did not have to redesign in its 1980s brake system to use non-asbestos parts and that Honda’s complete model redesign regularly occurred every four to five years as new models were produced.
At trial, the jury found that Honda vehicles were defectively designed, that Honda failed to warn plaintiff of such defect and that Honda was negligent for the same. Despite this the jury additionally found that Honda’s conduct was not a substantial factor in plaintiff’s harm. As such, Honda was not held liable for plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos from other companies’ break products used on Honda vehicles. Plaintiff moved for a new trial. The trial court ultimately denied plaintiff’s motion.
Plaintiff subsequently appealed, arguing that in the original trial, the jury was instructed that Honda was not “liable for [Plaintiff’s] exposure to asbestos from other companies’ brake products used on Honda brand vehicles that [it] did not distribute or sell” in error. Plaintiff instead argued that Honda’s older brake system was designed to require asbestos replacement parts and the special instruction should have, instead, instructed the jury to consider plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos from all brake work on Honda vehicles.
The Appellate Court ultimately found no reversal was warranted.
In reaching its decision, the court reiterated its longstanding jurisprudence that a party is entitled to “correct, nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case …which is supported by substantial evidence,” and that it is improper to give an instruction that lacks support in the evidence. With specific reference to the court’s finding of non-liability against Honda, the court relied on the matter of O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012). This matter provides that a defendant is liable only for harm caused by “asbestos-containing products it puts in the stream of commerce,” not replacement products manufactured by others unless it requires such products. The court further opined that O’Neil provided that a manufacturer would only be held responsible for another manufacturer’s product where: (1) its own product contributed substantially to the harm, or (2) it participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use. As such, the court held mere compatibility with asbestos is components is insufficient to hold a manufacturer liable.
Applying such jurisprudence, the court relied on the testimony that Honda’s brake system in the 1980’s did not have to be redesigned to use non-asbestos parts, and that rather the redesign was attributed to a regular redesign that Honda undertook every four to five years, when it introduced a new model to come to the conclusion that Honda did not require asbestos-containing replacement products for its braking system, as no substantial evidence existed to suggest Honda vehicles “required” asbestos containing brake materials to function properly. The court, therefore, found Honda was properly entitled to a special instruction limiting its liability to its asbestos-containing OEM brake products, and that liability properly failed to attach.