Jurisdiction: Court of Appeals of Indiana

In this asbestos action, it was alleged that decedent, Ronald McBride had asbestos exposure from the use of asbestos-containing talcum powder products while living in Indiana and Florida from 1970 to 2021. In August 2021, it was further claimed that Mr. McBride was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma because of the purported asbestos exposure. 

In October 2021, Mr. McBride and his spouse, Michele McBride commenced a mass-tort action by filing a complaint with the Marion County Superior Court in Indiana naming over 20 defendants. Mr. and Mrs. McBride alleged the defendants manufactured, sold or distributed asbestos-containing talcum-powder products, which caused Mr. McBride’s mesothelioma. Mr. McBride passed away in November 2022 and his estate was substituted for him. Mrs. McBride subsequently filed an Amended Complaint to join an additional seven defendants in this action, including PTI Union LLC, a Delaware limited-liability company with its principal place of business in Missouri. PTI Union is a contract manufacturer that blends and bottles products to customer specifications.

As relevant here, PTI Union contracted to blend and bottle Caldesene talcum powder for Insight Pharmaceuticals, a Pennsylvania company. According to Mrs. McBride, PTI shipped over 200,000 bottles of Caldesene from Missouri to a warehouse in Plainfield, Ind., “over a period of years.”

In May 2023, PTI union moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(2). In its motion to dismiss, PTI Union argued it isn’t subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana because it is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business in this state. PTI Union further argued that it is not subject to specific jurisdiction in Indiana due to a lack of sufficient contacts. PTI Union attached an affidavit from Michael Brasher, its director of quality, in support of this motion to dismiss. The affidavit declared, among other things, that: PTI Union was formed as a Delaware limited liability company on November 13, 2007; PTI Union’s principal place of business is, and always has been, in Missouri; PTI Union, LLC is a contractor that blends and bottles products to customer specifications at a facility in Union, Missouri; at certain times, PTI Union contracted with Insight Pharmaceuticals to blend and bottle talc-containing Caldesene powder to Insight Pharmaceutical[s’] specifications; Insight Pharmaceuticals controlled, directed and paid for the shipment of Caldesene powder from PTI Union’s Missouri facility; Insight owned and controlled the Caldesene product at the time Caldesene was picked up from the loading docks in Missouri by the Insight-designated carrier; PTI Union played no role in the decisions regarding where Caldesene powder would be shipped or distributed, including to Indiana or anywhere else; and PTI Union played no role in determining the content of the final distribution, marketing or sale of any Caldesene powder to consumers in Indiana or anywhere else.

In December 2023, the trial court heard oral argument on PTI Union’s motion to dismiss. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss as to PTI Union. The trial court found, among other things, that PTI Union’s ongoing contractual relationship for the production of Caldesene powder along with the volume of Caldesene powder regularly shipped to Indiana over a period of years created a substantial connection to Indiana such that PTI Union could reasonably anticipate being called into court here to defend itself for an injury caused by the product they manufactured, to deny PTI Union’s motion to dismiss. PTI Union timely filed an appeal following the denial of its motion to dismiss. 

Under Indiana law, when a defendant challenges the existence of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present evidence of the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Aquatherm GmbH v. Renaissance Assocs. I Ltd. P’ship, 140 N.E.3d 349, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The defendant, however, bears the ultimate burden of proving lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, unless such lack is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Id. Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) is Indiana’s equivalent of a ‘long-arm statute.'” Id. It enumerates eight acts that may serve as a basis for an Indiana trial court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident and further provides that “a court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or the United States.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, this catchall language “was intended to, and does, reduce analysis of personal jurisdiction to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause.” LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006).  In view of these principles, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021).

A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction: “general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 358.

With regard to general jurisdiction, the trial court noted: “A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the State.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017). “General jurisdiction, as its name implies, extends to any and all claims brought against a defendant.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 358. As the Supreme Court has explained, an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of domicile. And the equivalent forums for a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal place of business. Id. at 358-59.  Here, PTI Union is neither incorporated in Indiana nor does it have its principal place of business here. Thus, there was no general jurisdiction.  See Spokane Kart Racing Ass’n v. Am. Kart Track Promoters Ass’n, 206 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

The court next considered whether there is specific jurisdiction regarding PTI Union. Specific jurisdiction “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359. “The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name ‘purposeful availment.'” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The United States Supreme Court has articulated several markers for “purposeful availment”: The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous. They must show that the defendant deliberately reached out beyond its home — by, for example, exploi[ting] a market in the forum state or entering a contractual relationship centered there. Yet even then — because the defendant is not “at home”—the forum state may exercise jurisdiction in only certain cases. The plaintiff’s claims, we have often stated, must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. A defendant, though, must do something more than just place a product in the stream of commerce, and mere knowledge that a product would end up in a particular state is not enough. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); and Sebring v. Air Equipment & Engineering, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

PTI Union primarily argued it did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Indiana. It specifically claimed its involvement in the production of Caldesene was limited to blending and bottling the product in Missouri according to Insight’s specifications and that it played no role in deciding where Caldesene would be shipped as those decisions were made exclusively by Insight. As such, PTI Union’s argument was it merely placed a product into the stream of commerce and therefore this is insufficient to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction in Indiana. Id.

Mrs. McBride, on the contrary, argued that PTI Union had duties and responsibilities after the product left its dock by being responsible for investigating, tracking and taking corrective action in response to consumer complaints, which would include consumer complaints originating from Indiana. Mrs. McBride therefore argued PTI Union is subject to specific jurisdiction in Indiana because it had sufficient contacts with the state.

The Appeals Court of Indiana did not find Mrs. McBride’s arguments persuasive. Consequently, the Appeals Court of Indiana ultimately held PTI Union did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Indiana to warrant an exercise of specific jurisdiction. The trial court therefore erred in denying PTI Union’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appeals Court of Indiana therefore remanded this case with instructions for the trial court to grant PTI Union’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Read the full decision here.