Jurisdiction:  United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, plaintiff Joseph Schneider initiated a lawsuit naming former employers Huntington Ingalls Inc., formerly known as Avondale, and Illinois Central Railroad Company (IC) as defendants.

Critically, plaintiff asserted his claims against IC, a railroad employer, under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) only.  After removing the action to federal court, Avondale filed a crossclaim against IC seeking virile share contribution, allocation of comparative fault, and/or indemnity for any amounts for which Avondale may be cast in judgment.  IC moved to dismiss Avondale’s crossclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

According to Avondale, IC knew or should have known that exposing plaintiff to asbestos-containing materials would cause injury, and despite this knowledge, it failed to provide proper protection and/or warnings to plaintiff.  This failure made IC liable pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, which states: “Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”  La Civ Code § art.2315.  IC argued that it could not be held liable to Avondale under the Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 because plaintiff’s sole remedy against IC lies under FELA.

The court held that FELA exists as the exclusive remedy governing a railroad’s liability to its employees for injuries sustained while engaging in interstate commerce.  As such, it supersedes all state and municipal legislation and thus “preempts” a plaintiff’s claim brought under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code.  As such, IC cannot be held liable for an employee’s personal injury under this state statute.

Avondale argued that FELA’s exclusivity does not foreclose a third-party’s claim for contribution under applicable Louisiana state law. Under this theory Avondale contended that contribution rights under Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 survive FELA’s exclusivity.  However, the court found IC’s motion did not contest this issue and instead found Avondale’s argument addressed a completely different question altogether. IC did not seek to dismiss Avondale’s claim to contribution predicated on IC’s liability to plaintiff under FELA. Instead, IC argued that Avondale could not predicate any contribution claim on IC’s purported liability to plaintiff under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 because it has no such liability as a matter of law.

Consequently, the court determined IC could not be held liable for employee personal injury under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code and Avondale’s crossclaim must be dismissed with prejudice. Nothing in article 2315 addresses Avondale’s supposed entitlement to contribution based on IC’s liability under FELA. In fact precedent establishes that the fact a party is liable under FELA and third party defendant may be liable under general tort law “does not preclude an in solido obligation,” because “[i]t is the coextensiveness of the obligations for the same debt, and not the source of liability, that determines the solidarity of the obligation.” Schneider v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201197, at *4-5 (ED La Sep. 8, 2026, No. 25-2233). Thus, Louisiana state law may separately govern contribution among parties liable for the same injury, even when a railroad’s underlying liability arises under FELA.

Accordingly, the court granted IC’s motion to dismiss because Avondale’s focus was outside the scope of IC’s motion.

Read the full decision here