KEY TAKEAWAYS:

• As of July 15, 2026, the Second Circuit’s old three-part test is no longer good law.

• A plaintiff in a Title VII religious accommodation claim must now show that they actually required a religious accommodation and that the employer’s desire to avoid it was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, not that they informed the employer of a bona fide belief.

In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, decided on July 15, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. nullified the Circuit’s longstanding test for religious failure-to-accommodate claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). This ruling replaces the prior three-part prima facie framework with a motive-focused standard, and it clarifies how courts should treat an employer’s litigation statements.

Background of the Case

Jessica Bergin, a Unified Court System (UCS) court officer since 2016, was required under a September 2021 UCS policy to receive a COVID-19 vaccination or obtain a medical or religious exemption to remain at work. She submitted a religious exemption request with a personal statement, scripture verses, and a letter from her pastor objecting to the use of fetal stem-cell lines in the vaccines. UCS asked her to complete a supplemental form, which she returned largely unanswered. UCS denied the request, deemed her later completed form untimely, and terminated her employment on April 7, 2022.

Bergin sued under Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision, claiming a failure to accommodate her rather than challenging the policy itself. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted her partial summary judgment, finding a prima facie case and no undue hardship, resting largely on UCS’s purported admission that her initial request was “perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief.” UCS appealed.

The Legal Framework and the Court’s Analysis

Title VII prohibits religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation of religious practice, absent undue hardship to the employer. Courts analyze such claims in two steps: 1) the prima facie case; and 2) reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Bergin concerns only the first.

To make out a prima facie case, the Second Circuit’s former test required a plaintiff to show: 1) a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a work requirement; 2) that she informed the employer; and 3) that she was disciplined for noncompliance. But in Abercrombie, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need only show that her need for an accommodation was “a motivating factor in the employer’s decision” because the disparate-treatment provision “prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” A request or employer knowledge may make motive easier to infer, but “is not a necessary condition of liability.”

Now, in Bergin, the Second Circuit concluded that Abercrombie “broke the link” on which its prior precedent rested; the old rule included an employer-knowledge requirement and did not expressly require a showing of motive, so it could no longer stand.

On the second issue, the Second Circuit addressed the District Court’s finding that UCS had judicially admitted the sincerity of Bergin’s belief. A judicial admission must be “intentional, clear, and unambiguous,” and statements of counsel must carry “sufficient formality or conclusiveness.” Viewing UCS’s discovery statements in the light most favorable to UCS, the court found they did not rise to that level.  While UCS said the initial submission was “perfectly adequate” and did not contend Bergin lacked a good-faith objection, it also repeatedly emphasized that it needed more information to assess the sincerity and consistency of her beliefs. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the judgment and remanded, directing the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York to reassess summary judgment under the Abercrombie standard, treating evidence of the employer’s knowledge as relevant to, but not dispositive of, motive.

Recommended Steps for Employers

Because this very recent Second Circuit decision shifts the focus of religious accommodation litigation toward employer motive, HR and in-house counsel should:

• Document the reason for every denial and ground each exemption decision in an articulable, non-discriminatory basis (e.g. insufficient information, timeliness, or genuine operational hardship).
• Retrain reviewers and managers on the motive standard, emphasizing that liability can attach based on motive, even without full knowledge of an employee’s religious practice, and that mere awareness of a possible need does not by itself create liability.
• Engage in inquiries about sincerity or consistency uniformly and preserve a contemporaneous record of why additional information was requested.

If you have questions about how the revised Title VII Religious Accommodation Standard impacts your business, please contact:

• Christopher P. Maugans
• Cali L. Chandiramani
• Scott R. Green
• Caroline J. Berdzik
• Stephen C. Mazzara
• Or another member of the Employment and Labor team