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Appellate Court’s Liberal Ruling on Accident and Causation

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Appellate Court’s Liberal Ruling on Accident and Causation

KEY TAKEAWAYS:

  • In Cronk v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Appellate Court took a very liberal approach in determining what it takes to prove employment is a causative factor.

  • An accidental injury does not need to be the sole causative factor of an injury, nor even the primary causative factor, as long as it was a causative factor in the resulting condition of ill-being.

  • The fact a claimant was performing a job duty when an injury took place may be enough to establish a causal relationship, even when lacking in specific medical evidence.

In Cronk v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Appellate Court took a very liberal approach in determining what it takes to prove that employment is a causative factor, ruling:

An accidental injury does not need to be the sole causative factor of an injury, nor even the primary causative factor, as long as it was a causative factor in the resulting condition of ill-being. It is further established that, even when an employee has a preexisting condition which may make him more vulnerable to injury, recovery for an accidental injury will not be denied as long as it can be shown that the employment was also a causative factor.

The claimant in the case alleged that the decedent died while shoveling snow for his employer. The arbitrator originally denied benefits and found that the claimant failed to prove the decedent sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s decision and the claimant appealed to the Appellate Court.

The coroner determined that the decedent’s cause of death was hypertensive cardiovascular disease with coronary atherosclerosis being a significant contributor. The employer obtained a records review from a cardiologist, Dr. Carroll, who determined that the decedent’s coronary artery disease was most likely due to genetic factors, cholesterol, and daily cigarette smoking. Dr. Carroll believed physical exertion did not cause the decedent’s death. He further opined that “only shoveling a 10 x 10 section of driveway would not seem overly exertive.” Dr. Carroll concluded his report, however, stating that “given the temporal relationship between his shoveling activities and his development of chest pain, it would make sense that the two were related.”

The claimant sought their own records review from a cardiologist, Dr. Tamlyn, who found that the fatal event was “obviously brought on or aggravated by physical exertion” because the decedent developed symptoms consistent with cardiac ischemia while shoveling snow.

The Appellate Court reversed the Commission’s decision that the accident did not arise out of, and in the course of, the claimant’s employment. Its reasoning was the claimant was shoveling snow leading to the entrance of a home that was built by the employer, in anticipation of a visit from prospective buyers. The court stated that a claimant must only show that the injury occurred while performing a duty during employment, at a place where the decedent would be reasonably expected by his employer to perform the duty, and while the decedent fulfilled that duty or other incidental duties. The court took a liberal approach in determining that an accident arose out of an in the course of the claimant’s employment. The court found that it was a reasonably expected duty of the decedent, as construction manager, to clear snow from the driveway and sidewalk of a newly built house in anticipation of a visit from prospective buyers.

The court went on to determine that the manifest weight of the evidence showed that the decedent’s employment-related activity was a causative factor in his cardiac arrest. The court relied on Dr. Tamlyn’s report and was convinced by the fact that the decedent was shoveling snow at the time of the injury. The court found the fact that the decedent experienced difficulty breathing shortly after he started to shovel snow to be convincing evidence to establish causation.

In this case, the court applied causation liberally. There is little in the medical reports to show that the decedent’s activity shoveling snow was anything more than incidental to his heart attack. The coroner even described the cause of death as hypertensive cardiovascular disease instead of an acute myocardial infarction. For the Appellate Court, it appears that the fact that the decedent was snow shoveling at the time of the heart attack was sufficient to establish causation.

This ruling could spell trouble for employers in future cases, particularly those that involve claimants with pre-existing conditions. In this case, the Appellate Court was not interested in the quantity or details of the claimant’s activity snow shoveling at the time of the injury. Instead, it seems the simple fact that the claimant was performing the act during the onset of symptoms was enough to establish causation. The Appellate Court’s decision in Cronk could broaden both the kinds of accidents that can be considered to arise out of and in the course of employment and the kinds of injuries that can be deemed causally related to a claimant’s employment.

In Cronk, detailed evidence of the decedent’s accident may bolster the employer’s defense. We recommend respondents arm themselves fully with as much accident specifics as possible to improve their ability to dispute an accident. Job descriptions and witness testimony are key. Detailed accident reports, documented with witness statements as promptly as possible improve the credibility of disputes. In the context of pre-existing conditions, carefully crafted independent medical examinations (IME) or records review opinions can be formative in the fact finder supporting a denial position.

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